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Facial Recognition in Law Enforcement 
Cameron Martin* 
 
To be considered:1 Michael Thomas, a resident of Carrollton, Michigan, 
has been arrested repeatedly for crimes he did not commit. On October 
2018, Thomas saw a neighbor preparing to cut a tree from Thomas’s land. 
The two of them got into a heated argument when the neighbor claimed that 
the tree posed a danger in the case of a storm. Someone called the police, 
and a patrolman of the Carrolton Township Police Department (CTPD), 
Jack Vincennes, responded to the call. Patrolman Vincennes broke up the 
fight, but the facial-recognition feature of his CopperFR body camera 
attached to the front of his uniform flagged Thomas. This camera 
automatically took a picture of Thomas and sent it back to the precinct. The 
system identified Thomas as another person, Rollo Smith, who was the 
subject of an outstanding arrest warrant for robbery and murder in Los 
Angeles, California. Sergeant Edward Exley of the Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD) entered the warrant into CopperFR, which also 
contained three surveillance-video stills of Smith. 
Vincennes arrested Thomas, who was held for three days while the 
Carrolton and Los Angeles Police Departments (LAPD) conducted further 
investigations. On the fourth day, a comparison of his fingerprints and 
physical description with the LAPD’s records definitively showed that 
Thomas was not Smith, who, aside from having different fingerprints, also 
had several distinctive scars and tattoos. Thomas was released. 
 
*J.D. 2021, Seattle University School of Law. The author would like to thank the editors 
at The Seattle Journal for Social Justice,  and Professor Steve Tapia, Distinguished 
Practitioner in Residence at Seattle University School of Law. All of their keen eyes, 
patience, and support have truly made this article into something worthwhile. 
1 This excerpt was adapted from JAMES GRIMMELMANN, INTERNET LAW: CASES & 
PROBLEMS 664–65 (Semaphore Press ed., 9th ed. 2019). 
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In March 2019, Thomas was driving when he was stopped for failure to 
use a turn signal by Bay County sheriff’s deputy Bud White outside of 
Saginaw, Michigan. Deputy White used a CopperFR body camera which 
also flagged Thomas as Smith. Smith’s same warrants remained 
outstanding. As a result, Deputy White ordered Thomas out of the car at 
gunpoint, then searched, handcuffed, and arrested him. Two hours after 
Deputy White made phone calls to the Saginaw Police and the LAPD, 
Thomas was released. 
Since the last arrest in March, Thomas has been arrested three more 
times—twice at gunpoint—by police in Michigan and Texas. Each time, 
Thomas was released after his true identity was confirmed. He contacted 
CopperFR, which refused to discuss the specifics of its system or Smith’s 
record with him, stating that “only the originating law enforcement agency 
could delete, amend, or correct the computer warrant entry.” He also spoke 
to Captain Dudley Smith of the LAPD, who refused to delete the entry for 
Smith citing the “need to preserve an ongoing investigation.”2 
Although the above is just a hypothetical scenario, a similar interaction 
has actually occurred. Robert Julian-Borchak Williams, a Black man in 
Michigan, was arrested in front of his home and taken to a detention center 
based on a faulty facial recognition algorithmic match.3 A low quality 
image from a jewelry store theft had matched with Mr. Williams’ driver’s 
license photo which led to his subsequent arrest.4 Fortunately, he was later 
released and the county prosecutor claimed his face and fingerprint data 
would be expunged.5 However, what will make up for the time Mr. 
Williams spent in jail due to a faulty unregulated system? There are 
currently no laws, regulations, or standards keeping this interaction between 
 
2 Id. 
3 Kashmir Hill, Wrongfully Accused by an Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2020, 
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law enforcement, facial recognition technology, and the public from 
occurring. Although some smaller municipalities have banned certain uses 
of facial recognition, instances like this could become the norm. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The ungoverned use of facial recognition software can result in 
significant disparities in improper applications against already subjugated 
groups; ultimately, it poses significant threats to both civil rights and civil 
liberties if used by law enforcement today due to its untested and biased 
capabilities.6 
Facial recognition software or technology (FRT) is software that can 
make use of a camera and image to analyze a human face for the purpose of 
identification.7 To identify a face, FRT takes the biometric data provided by 
a captured image from a photograph or video and matches it to other images 
in a data set.8 There is a wide variety of uses for FRT, such as unlocking a 
cell phone, identifying a person in a photo posted on a social networking 
site, or identifying recently landed passengers at an airport security 
checkpoint.9 Requiring a face to unlock a personal cell phone provides 
users with a sense of security.10 A user makes the choice to allow the phone 
to take their picture and use the facial recognition feature as a self-selected 
password; therefore, a user decides on their own to use their face to unlock 
 
6 See generally H.B. 1654, 66th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019). 
7 Face Recognition Technology, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-
technology/surveillance-technologies/face-recognition-technology 
[https://perma.cc/4ZM6-CKCS]. 




10 Lynn La, 10 Best Phones with Facial Recognition: iPhone X, Note 9, LG G7 and 
More, CNET (Aug. 22, 2018, 9:00PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/10-best-phones-
with-facial-recognition-iphone-x-note-9-galaxy-s9-lg-g7/ [https://perma.cc/P7MF-
4UUW]. 
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their device.11 In order to get an accurate face scan on a phone, the user 
must do multiple scans.12 For the user, there may be an increased sense of 
ease in not having to enter, or remember, the multiple digits or letters of a 
password to unlock the phone.13 Furthermore, security is increased by using 
a face rather than a password.14 According to Xfinity, “The chances of a 
random person being able to unlock your phone are one in a million.”15 
Theoretically, unless the user’s phone is hacked or the user has an identical 
twin, there should not be a way into the phone.16 The user’s picture is taken 
and only stored in the phone.17 However, not all uses of FRT are that 
straightforward, nor are all FRT face scans done by the choice of the 
subject of the technology.18 The use of facial recognition software relies on 
the gathering of information, which is often done without any consent given 
by the parties being analyzed by the software.19 
Due to the growth of the technology market, the reach of facial 
recognition software and its reported capabilities beyond just face matching 
are consistently expanding.20 Currently, “[t]he facial recognition market is 
expected to grow to $7.7 billion in 2022 from $4 billion in 2017. That 
growth is because of new commercial applications. This technology can be 
used for everything from surveillance to marketing.”21 Top FRT companies 
 
11 See Use Face ID on Your iPhone or iPad Pro, APPLE, INC., 
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208109 [https://perma.cc/B3XC-GBZ2]. 
12 Id. 







18 See Clare Garvie & Laura M. Moy, America Under Watch: Face Surveillance in the 
United States, GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH. (May 16, 2019), 
https://www.americaunderwatch.com/ [https://perma.cc/972A-FGA2]. 
19 See Face Recognition Technology, supra note 7. 
20 Symanovich, supra note 8. 
21 Id. 
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market their technology in fairly straightforward ways, often with a direct 
call to law enforcement users.22 Amazon’s FRT “Rekognition” advertises 
that it “provides highly accurate facial analysis, face comparison, and face 
search capabilities. You can detect, analyze, and compare faces for a wide 
variety of use cases, including user verification, cataloging, people 
counting, and public safety.”23 Microsoft’s Azure Face APIs provide 
services such as face detection; face matching, a feature to find similar 
looking faces; and person identification.24 In contrast, IBM markets their 
Watson Visual Recognition API specifically for use in real-time.25 Law 
enforcement agencies have hired some companies to do specific research 
and technological expansion for their departments.26 In late 2016 and early 
2017, IBM attempted to market its facial recognition product’s newly 
developed ability to search for people by ethnicity specifically to law 
enforcement.27 An IBM researcher at that time stated that it developed the 
software with ethnicity tags at the request of the NYPD, but the NYPD 
decided not to use the new software after testing it.28 The IBM researcher 
affirmed, “We would have not explored it had the NYPD told us, ‘We don’t 
 




24 What is the Azure Face Service?, MICROSOFT (Sept. 17, 2020), 
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cognitive-services/face/overview 
[https://perma.cc/V7HU-YUPL]. 
25 Integrating IBM Intelligent Video Analytics with IBM i2 Facial Recognition, IBM, 
https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/en/SS88XH_1.6.1/iva/int_i2frs_intro.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/X8LA-NFYB]. 
26 George Joseph & Kenneth Lipp, IBM Used NYPD Surveillance Footage to Develop 
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want to do that,’” . . . “No company is going to spend money where there’s 
not customer interest.”29 
If the IBM researcher’s assertion is to be believed, that companies are 
only expanding their FRT offerings based on market demand, then 
Amazon’s “Rekognition” software’s purported capability to detect human 
emotions must be desirable.30 In 2019, Amazon expanded Rekognition’s 
range of detectable emotions to be competitive with other FRT companies 
who also purport to be able to recognize emotions. 31 In a blog post, 
Amazon announced it had “improved accuracy for emotion detection (for 
all 7 emotions [previously detected]: ‘Happy,’ ‘Sad,’ ‘Angry,’ ‘Surprised,’ 
‘Disgusted,’ ‘Calm,’ and ‘Confused’) and added a new emotion: ‘Fear.’”32 
The technology registers facial expressions, such as raised eyebrows or a 
downturned mouth, and attempts to turn those into a determination of 
emotion.33 Aside from the negative implications of what might happen if 
this particular part of FRT were used in law enforcement and the potential 
to heighten alarm in conflict situations if the technology registeres the 
emotion as fearful or angry, a study of over 1,000 academic papers has 
determined that “there just isn’t a strong enough correlation between facial 
expressions and actual human emotions, and common methods for training 
algorithms to spot emotions present a host of other problems.” 34 Yet, this 
 
29 Id. 
30 See Janus Rose, Amazon Says the Face Recognition Tech it Sells to Cops Can Now 




32 Press Release, Amazon Web Servs., Inc., Amazon Rekognition Improves Face 
Analysis (Aug. 12, 2019), https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-
new/2019/08/amazon-rekognition-improves-face-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/FZ5U-
G33Z]. 
33 Rose, supra note 30. 
34 Id. 
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emotional detection technology has already been used in hiring processes 
and attempts to determine if someone is trying to commit insurance fraud.35 
Other companies have either developed or are working on software that 
can determine a person’s sexuality, propensity to commit crimes, 
Intelligence Quotient, and propensity to commit terrorism, solely from 
faces.36 Most known–—or reported–—uses of FRT by law enforcement are 
(1) basic face detection, where the facial recognition software is able to 
scan an image and determine where faces are present in that image, and (2) 
face matching, the most contentious use, where probe images (a picture or 
screenshot from a camera) are run against a database of photos to determine 
if there is a match. However, the lack of regulation on the use of FRT in 
law enforcement and the continued expansion of the FRT capabilities as the 
market grows highlight the need to reconsider the wild west mentality 
toward FRT in law enforcement. If FRT is used to imply intent to commit a 
crime, then we end up in a world brushing against due process violations or 
extremely heightened surveillance at the very least. As determined by the 
United States Supreme Court, “A person does not surrender all Fourth 
Amendment [privacy] protection by venturing into the public sphere.”37 
The first section of this article will discuss generally on how facial 
recognition functions. The second section includes a discussion of the 
current inherent inaccuracies of facial recognition technology by way of 
identifying not only the incapabilities of the technology itself, but also the 
inherent biases in the coding of the technology. The third section provides 
an in-depth look at how the technology is acquired and used by law 
enforcement agencies without oversight or regulation. Fourth, this article 
 
35 Angela Chen, Computers Can’t Tell if You’re Happy when You Smile, MIT TECH. 
REV. (July 26, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/614015/emotion-recognition-
technology-artifical-intelligence-inaccurate-psychology/ [https://perma.cc/M7BT-649J]. 
36 Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy 
Disparities in 
Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACH. LEARNING RES. 1, 2–3 (2018). 
37 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018). 
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proposes a legislative solution for municipalities, beginning with a 
moratorium on the unfettered use of facial recognition technology by law 
enforcement and concluding with suggestions for possible 
reimplementation where it is deemed reasonable and useful. 
II. HOW FACIAL RECOGNITION WORKS 
When facial recognition is not done on a phone, the process works a bit 
differently. To take a reading on a face, FRT analyzes key facial landmarks 
in the geometry of the face.38 Facial landmarks include the distance between 
the eyes, the size of the nose, and the distance between the nose and the 
chin.39 Collectively, the size and distance of the facial landmarks create a 
facial signature.40 Different FRT systems gather different amounts of facial 
information, and some systems are purported to identify sixty-eight 
different facial landmarks.41 The collection of measurements is then used to 
create the unique formula that is a facial signature or face template.42 
Theoretically, a face template can function as well as or better than a 
person’s own signature—it is extremely unique.43 It is important to note 
that a face template, a conglomeration of the algorithmic choices 
programmed into the FRT, is not the same as a photograph.44 If the FRT is 
not set to detect certain features (an issue discussed below), then those 
features will not be taken into account when distinguishing between 
matches.45 
For the recognition part of FRT to occur, the mathematically created face 
template must be matched to other face templates generated from a 
 
38 Symanovich, supra note 8. 
39 See id. 
40 Id. 
41 See id. 
42 Id. 
43 See What Is Facial Recognition on a Phone, supra note 13. 
44 Street-Level Surveillance: Face Recognition, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 24, 
2017), https://www.eff.org/pages/face-recognition [https://perma.cc/VSV3-VGFQ]. 
45 See id. 
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collection of images.46 These images come from a database of “known 
faces.”47 The databases used for FRT are dependent on the user. For 
example, a company using Amazon’s “Rekognition” simply uploads the 
images they would like the technology to match up.48 Additionally, 
companies may use FRT for facial verification in their building security to 
match employee ID pictures with those going in or out of a building or 
secure room. In 2016, as many as forty-three out of fifty states used some 
form of FRT through their Departments of Motor Vehicles’ creation of their 
databases from driver’s license photos.49 The Federal Bureau of 
Investigations has a database of photos collected through its own repository 
of mugshot and correctional photos and expanded by driver’s license photos 
and visa applicant photos from partnerships with local state and municipal 
agencies.50 As of 2019, this database had over 641 million faces.51 
III. INACCURACIES AND BIASES IN FACIAL RECOGNITION 
TECHNOLOGY 
When FRT is making a match, the software allows for a choice on how 
accurate the match may be.52 The necessary accuracy will likely be 
dependent on the situation; for instance, a 100% accurate match is not 
 
46 See id. 
47 Symanovich, supra note 8. 
48 Amazon Rekognition FAQs, AMAZON WEB SERVS., INC., 
https://aws.amazon.com/rekognition/faqs/ [https://perma.cc/MN5B-GSCT]. 
49 Russell Brandom, How States Use Facial Recognition to Sniff Out Driver’s License 
Fraud, VERGE (Aug. 15, 2016, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2016/8/15/12478212/facial-recognition-drivers-license-photo-
realid-dmv [https://perma.cc/A4FY-4GDP]. 
50 GRETTA L. GOODWIN, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-579T, FACE 
RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: DOJ AND FBI HAVE TAKEN SOME ACTIONS IN RESPONSE 
TO GAO RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENSURE PRIVACY AND ACCURACY, BUT ADDITIONAL 
WORK REMAINS 5–6 (2019). 
51 Id. 
52 Ben Virdee-Chapman, The Secret to Better Face Recognition Accuracy: Thresholds, 
KAIROS (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.kairos.com/blog/the-secret-to-better-face-
recognition-accuracy-thresholds [https://perma.cc/LZ6X-XPFH]. 
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needed for a phone application or game that is meant to tell the user what 
famous person they look most like. The range of accuracy is determined by 
the user-chosen threshold which is a “user setting for Facial Recognition 
Systems for authentication, verification or identification. The acceptance or 
rejection of a Facial Template match is dependent on the match score 
falling above or below the threshold. The threshold is adjustable within the 
Facial Recognition System.”53 Theoretically, if facial recognition is used in 
law enforcement, a threshold could be set at 100%; if it were, only perfect 
matches would be made. The greatest issue of FRT use in law enforcement 
arises where imperfect matches are made. Currently, due to insufficient 
algorithms from which the technology draws or problems in the algorithmic 
programming of the facial recognition software, there is an increased 
chance of a mismatch for groups of people that are not male and white.54 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),55 a non-
regulatory physical sciences laboratory that functions out of the United 
States Department of Commerce, has been posting its demographic testing 
results on FRT since 2017.56 NIST’s findings have determined that even the 
best FRT algorithms have a mismatch rate that is five to ten times greater 
for persons of color. 57 Idemia, a technology used by Customs and Border 
Protection in the United States, “falsely matched different white women’s 
faces at a rate of one in 10,000,” yet, “it falsely matched black women’s 
faces about once in 1,000—10 times more frequently” at the same 
threshold.58 Although NIST’s overall findings reported that between 2014 
and 2018, FRT became twenty times better at generating matches, the 
 
53 Id. 
54 See Tom Simonite, The Best Algorithms Struggle to Recognize Black Faces Equally, 
WIRED (July 22, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/best-algorithms-struggle-
recognize-black-faces-equally/ [https://perma.cc/2BNR-WDX8]. 
55 About NIST, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. (updated June 14, 2017), 
https://www.nist.gov/about-nist [https://perma.cc/WJ3L-KZF3]. 
56 Simonite, supra note 54. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
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overall disparity in matching for different demographics should not be 
discounted.59 When facial recognition is used in law enforcement, that 
disparity can lead to drastically different outcomes for different 
communities. Importantly, NIST’s tests found great variance in accuracy, 
with some new algorithms underperforming the older algorithms when 
minimizing false positives, which should be of the utmost importance in 
law enforcement use. 60 
Gender Shades, another independent study that focused mainly on the 
disparity in determining matches with FRT between different skin shades 
and gender, found similarly enormous disparities.61 This study examined 
reasons why FRT is coming up with biased search results based on skin 
tones and concluded that the actual programming of the software itself is to 
blame because of the phenotypic (the way people look, e.g. skin 




59 See NIST Evaluation Shows Advance in Face Recognition Software’s Capabilities, 
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.nist.gov/news-
events/news/2018/11/nist-evaluation-shows-advance-face-recognition-softwares-
capabilities [https://perma.cc/U8QX-LC94]. 
60 See id. 
61 Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 36. 
62 Id. 
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The Gender Shades study shows the difference, when evaluating the 
capabilities of an FRT, between the technologies’ reported match capability 
and the actual matching ability when broken down by gender and skin 
shade. The test evaluated those in its matching database according to a 
“dermatologist approved Fitzpatrick skin type classification system [which] 
was used to label faces as Fitzpatrick Types I, II, III, IV, V, or VI.”65 Types 
I, II, and III are classified as “lighter” in this study, and Types IV, V, and 
VI are grouped as “darker.” 66 
The Gender Shades study shows that given the same threshold in which 
to determine a match, each top company was able to better determine 
matches on males than females and were signifcantly better at determining 
accurate matches on women of lighter skin tones than those of darker skin 
tones.67 Ultimately, the results of this study are comparable to those of 
NIST: both portray the stark difference between an FRT’s capability to 
accurately find matches for males of lighter skin tones and males of darker 
skin tones. This study calls for “rigorous reporting on the performance 
metrics” focused on “increasing phenotypic and demographic 
representation in face datasets and algorithmic evaluation.”68 Therefore, 
FRT systems may be biased from their implementation and, if ever used, 
need to be continually tested. Law enforcement agencies should take these 
kinds of differences into account when determining what FRT systems they 
might use, and it should be intrinsic to the decision to use a system at all. If 
the system is used in policing and its results are statistically biased, that will 
ultimately lead to biased policing. 
Another study was conducted in 2018 by the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) using “Rekognition,” Amazon’s facial recognition software 
 
65 See Results, supra note 63. 
66 See id. 
67 Id. 
68 Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 36. 
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that was sold to law enforcement agencies in the past.69 In this test, the 
software incorrectly matched twenty-eight members of Congress to those in 
a database of mugshots, identifying these members of Congress as people 
who have been arrested for a crime.70 According to the ACLU, “nearly 40 
percent of Rekognition’s false matches in our test were of people of color, 
even though they make up only 20 percent of Congress.”71 The ACLU used 
publicly available arrest photos and used the Amazon recommended 
threshold settings to run the test.72 A match test for all of the members of 
the House of Representatives and the Senate cost less than $13.00.73 A few 
issues arose from this testing: in addition to the disparity in accuracy for 
those of darker skin tones, the rather inexpensive pricing likely made FRT 
seem like a relatively cheap tool for law enforcement to use. Although it 
might be cost effective, the inaccuracy related to skin color could lead to 
frightening results in a real-time policing situation. For example, a routine 
traffic stop could turn into a dangerous situation if police use facial 
recognition in a body camera and the driver is mismatched. 
Another troubling issue that has emerged from studies of FRT is that the 
technology can only determine gender in binary terms of male or female.74 
A study surveying the most popular FRT companies found that only one 
company, Clarifai, used a classification that was not strictly binary; Clarifai 
classified “gender appearance,” returning values of “feminine” and 
“masculine,” rather than the binaries of “female” and “male” used by other 
 
69 See Jacob Snow, Amazon’s Face Recognition Falsely Matched 28 Members of 






73 See id. 
74 See Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 36. (“In this work we use the sex labels of 
‘male’ and ‘female’ to define gender classes since the evaluated benchmarks and 
classification systems use these binary labels.”). 
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companies.75 The table below shows that most FRTs define a gender 
category; some FRTs also assign a probability score between zero and one 
for each classification.76 








Amazon Rekognition United States Male/Female Incl. 




India Male/Female Incl. 
Clarifai  United States Masculine/Feminine Incl. 








United States Male/Female Incl. 
Imagga  Bulgaria N/A N/A 
Kairos  United States M/F Incl. 
3Morgan Klaus Scheuerman, Jacob M. Paul & Jed R. Brubaker, 144:8 
 
 
75 See Morgan Klaus Scheuerman, Jacob M. Paul & Jed R. Brubaker, How Computers 
See Gender: An Evaluation of Gender Classification in Commercial Facial Analysis and 
Image Labeling Services, 3 PROC. ACM HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTION 144:1, 144:8 
(2019). 
76 See id. at 144:7. 
77 Id. 
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This restrictive binary system in FRTs speaks directly to the inherent 
inaccuracies still interlaced with the technologies. This same study found 
that there were inconsistencies between technologies in making binary 
determinations (e.g. one determines male and another female).78 Google’s 
Cloud Vision, which does not purport to classify by gender, nevertheless 
assigned labels to an image.79 The study noted that a single image could be 
assigned multiple labels, such as “person,” “boy,” “daughter,” and “son.”80 
A University of Colorado study of Amazon, Clarifai, IBM, and Microsoft’s 
FRTs took 2,450 face images posts from Instagram.81 Each post used one of 
seven hashtag identifiers: “#women,” “#man,” “#transwoman,” 
“#transman,” “#agender,” “#agenderqueer,” and “#nonbinary.”82 The study 
found that cisgender men and women were correctly identified more than 
97% of the time, while “trans men . . . were incorrectly identified as women 
in up to 38 percent of instances . . . [and] those who identified as agender, 
genderqueer or non-binary, were misclassified 100 percent of the time 
because these gender identities have not been built into the algorithms.”83 
The accuracy of the technology requires that the software be of the highest 
caliber; that the image or probe photo, captured from a photograph or video, 
must be of a high enough quality for the software to analyze what it should 
match from an input; and that the software be programmed with the ability 
to match the image data it is given.84 
 
78 See id. at 144:10. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Jesse Damiani, New Research Reveals Facial Recognition Software Misclassifies 






84 See Clare Garvie, Garbage in, Garbage out: Face Recognition on Flawed Face Data, 
GEO. L. CTR. PRIV. & TECH. (May 16, 2019), https://www.flawedfacedata.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/97PD-HLXB]. 
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Inaccuracies that are embedded in FRT coding are also exacerbated by 
the common practice of using and reusing data libraries (old code, and/or 
data informing code) in the initial software development process.85 It is 
common for FRT developers to take data for facial recognition software 
development from older, biased code libraries; this practice contravenes the 
idea that technologies become better and less biased over time.86 Notably, 
the survey in the table above was of FRT from companies most commonly 
used by law enforcement agencies (where bias and inaccuracy have even 
more dire consequences) such as Vigilant Solutions, Cognitec, NEC, Rank 
One Computing, and Clearview AI.87 
Facial recognition requires accuracy. FRT systems that do not classify 
people properly are inaccurate and biased; neither of these issues are likely 
to be addressed and corrected unless consumers (especially law 
enforcement agencies) demand that FRT companies make adjustments to 
their codes. 
IV. CURRENT UNVETTED AND UNREGULATED USES BY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
In the United States, the use or proposed use of facial recognition 
software is prevalent in a myriad of places: from schools, to stadiums, to 
police forces.88 Regardless of whether FRT is used by law enforcement or 
private security organizations, when that use is publicly disclosed, it has 
often been fraught with controversy worldwide. Controversy, which has 
been almost exclusively public backlash, has led to little, if any, regulation. 
One of the earliest examples was the Super Bowl in 2001 where FRT was 
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used in the security systems at the Tampa Bay stadium, leading to the 
identification of nineteen subjects thought to have outstanding warrants.89 
This incident did not lead to any arrests because law enforcement was 
unprepared to handle the sheer volume of identifications or the challenge of 
finding and arresting the individuals.90 “We thought we were ready to use 
it, but getting through the crowd and the architecture of the stadium proved 
overwhelming,” said one law enforcement agent present at the stadium.91 
The public backlash was immediate, particularly from the ACLU.92 A 
similar situation occurred a decade ago, when Google released a new face-
tracking webcam that was unable to see and track Black people, but could 
identify white people.93 “In 2015, Google apologized after its then-new 
Photos application labeled some Black people as ‘gorillas.’”94 More 
recently, in late 2018, FRT was reportedly used at a Taylor Swift concert to 
match concert-goers to a database of potential stalkers of the pop star.95 
More pernicious uses of FRT directly impact vulnerable communities, such 
as the use of Facebook to track Black Lives Matter participants and license 
plate readers to track Muslim community members.96 The Chinese 
government currently uses facial recognition technology for general 
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monitoring and possibly social control.97 A controversial ruling in South 
Wales allows FRT use by the police despite claims of breach of privacy and 
data protection.98 In Washington State, previously undisclosed emails were 
released through an email listserv called “FITlist, which showed cross-
departmental and cross-municipal use of FRT.”99 One particular email 
reads, “Do not mention FITlist in your reports or search warrant 
affidavits.”100 Not only does this mean that agencies are using FRT, but it 
also means that they are actively doing it in a manner not meant to be 
disclosed to the public. It was announced that facial recognition would be 
used by security at future planned large events, including the 2020 FIFA 
World Cup in Japan, the 2020 Olympics also in Japan, and the 2024 
Olympics in Paris.101 Furthermore, many municipalities use ClearviewAI 
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without a proper understanding of how the technology works.102 This 
technology was built by scrubbing billions of pictures from social media 
sites, yet its accuracy rates in matching non-white non-men remains 
untested.103 
The use of facial recognition software often relies on gathering 
information from subjects who have not given consent to the parties using 
the software.104 Most importantly, the unregulated and unvetted use of 
facial recognition technology by law enforcement has a detrimental impact 
on already vulnerable and overpoliced populations. The section below 
presents legislative action that must be taken by states to address the 
aforementioned issues inherent in facial recognition technology by 
regulating the use of FRT technology in law enforcement. 
V. MORATORIUM AND STRICT ASSESSMENT OF FRT BY 
LEGISLATURES 
The first step state legislatures must take is to enforce a moratorium on 
all law enforcement usage of facial recognition software. A moratorium 
would allow legislatures to first assess the legitimacy of looking into FRT 
usage; they could then evaluate the appropriate usage of FRTs by law 
enforcement, the limits on what functions a facial match may serve, and 
acceptable locations to implement the technology. 
After the moratorium, legislatures may decide that they would like to 
assess re-implementation of FRT. The assessment of FRT should be done 
through an appointed bipartisan vetting committee. The vetting committee 
would assess FRTs’ baseline capabilities in face matching confidence and 
would ultimately pick which technology will be used. The vetting 
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committee would also determine what sort of oversight, reporting, and 
training standards to impose upon municipalities that choose to implement 
FRTs. Additionally, the vetting committee would be responsible for 
proposing how data collected through FRT systems would be used and how 
transparency with the public would be managed. Lastly, if a state legislature 
decides to overcome an FRT moratorium, rules must be established to 
restrict any use of FRT in ways known to limit or threaten civil liberties. 
A. Moratorium 
A moratorium on the use of facial recognition software is the best option 
to protect against civil rights and liberties abuses until there is more 
transparency in how the technology is used, who is using the technology, 
and what the expected outcomes of the use of the technology are. The 
moratorium is therefore the best first step that both individual states and 
Washington D.C. can take before identifying facial recognition 
technologies for future use. An overall moratorium on law enforcement 
using facial recognition in policing is imperative because without clear 
policies in place to direct law enforcement in its usage, there is a heightened 
chance that law enforcement may use the technology in a manner it should 
not be used, such as to identify individuals in a crowd at a protest.105 
Proponents of unrestricted FRT use often emphasize threat detection and 
prevention as benefits that law enforcement will reap from using the 
technology.106 However, regulation is necessary to the extent that 
companies that make FRT are stepping forward and asking for regulation in 
this area.107 Concern has spread from the public sphere and into companies 
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that sell FRT due to a lack of transparency in how law enforcement uses 
FRT as well as the general lack of regulation on the technology’s use.108 
The CEO of facial recognition technology firm Kairos, Brian Brackeen, has 
stopped taking government contracts, stating, “In the hands of government 
surveillance programs and law enforcement agencies, there’s simply no 
way that face recognition software will be not used to harm citizens.”109 
Similarly, Microsoft President and Chief Legal Officer Brad Smith has 
called for FRT regulation while expressing concerns about the potential for 
discrimination in decision making, invasions on personal privacy, and mass 
surveillances’ encroachment on democratic freedoms.110 While some in law 
enforcement see the potential benefits to enforcement,111 a moratorium 
allows for assessment before the risk of putting citizens in harm’s way 
arises. 
If FRT is used by law enforcement to make a match to a picture of 
someone who looks like a suspect, then law enforcement must be clear 
about whether that match alone meets the burden of proof used to make that 
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person a suspect. Even when a clear picture of a suspect is analyzed by the 
FRT, the resulting match may have a lower rate of accuracy than one 
hundred percent if the person in the probe photo is not a white cisgender 
male.112 Therefore, before any facial recognition software is implemented, 
law enforcement should be required to use unbiased FRT software and 
follow clear regulations outlining how the software may be used. If FRT 
systems are used by police departments attempting to match probe images 
from a crime, improvements to the software may not directly address 
problems with bias: “improvements won’t matter much if there are no 
standards governing what police departments can feed into these 
systems.”113 If departments are incorporating probe photos that have been 
enhanced or altered, the corrections in software bias will not matter because 
the probe photos are based on conjecture ultimately altering the accuracy.114 
A moratorium allows for pause, assessment, and transparency because the 
use of FRT has the potential to get out of hand.115 
Once a moratorium is in place, state legislatures can then step in and 
assess the technology’s uses to decide whether there is any actual benefit 
without causing disparate harm to their communities, especially more 
vulnerable communities. The legislature can also determine whether 
implementing the software will allow for discriminatory practices. If FRT is 
used in the process of law enforcement, how a match can be used in that 
process must be decided by the state. If a match is used “only for 
investigative purposes,” as has been purported by enforcement agencies in 
the past, minute decisions must be made about how far a facial recognition 
match can allow an investigation to go.116 “Investigative purposes” is an 
unclear limitation set by the few agencies who have been transparent about 
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their own use and standards when doing FRT matches.117 The term does not 
provide enough detail into the process of investigation to provide a 
transparent marker for law enforcement to follow.118 States must set clear 
standards determining how far a match can carry an investigation. State 
legislatures can use the moratorium as a time to decide if a match alone is 
sufficient evidence to bring someone in for a lineup.119 More aggressively, 
legislatures might decide a matched photo, which is then confirmed by a 
witness who looks at that same matched photo, is all that is necessary for an 
arrest warrant.120 States must make these determinations prior to 
implementation, with a sense of the actual statistical capability of the FRT. 
As a result, legislatures can set clear and ongoing standards for 
implementation and regulation of FRT. 
B. State Driven Assessment of FRT and Policy Making is the Only Path for 
States to Move Beyond a Moratorium 
A moratorium on facial recognition software usage allows for regulation 
that encompasses increasing public safety while also protecting civil 
liberties, deterring discrimination, and remaining transparent. Once a 
moratorium is in place, regulations set by state legislatures can then 
determine exactly what policies will guide implementation of FRT at the 
local municipality level. The legislatures can then set minimum standards 
for FRT implementation and usage. Policies across a state allow for a 
cohesive, transparent, and enforceable structure. Statewide policies also 
allow for cost-effective implementation for smaller, less-resourced 
municipalities. Larger municipalities, which have the resources to cooperate 
with the defined standards to implement the technology, may provide use of 
FRT to smaller, less-resourced municipalities, which might not be able to 
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implement their own FRT while remaining in compliance with state-driven 
regulations. 
C. Implementation of a Vetting Committee 
The first step a state must take in re-introducing FRT technology after a 
moratorium is to decide how FRT technology will be used in the process of 
law enforcement. Vetting committees would inform this decision. Vetting 
committees would assess the capabilities of the FRT systems to be 
implemented, determine a minimum match score or match rate that is 
appropriate during the process, and suggest what steps law enforcement can 
take with a match once that match is found. A match made by law 
enforcement may be different for raw probe photos and enhanced probe 
photos; in anticipation of that distinction, the vetting committee would be 
responsible for determining if the FRT can be depended on to present 
reliable matches based on each. 
The limitations of the software must be considered when deliberating 
how the technology might be used, as it could help in an investigation or it 
could lead to warrants based on little more than suspicion.121 Because 
matches can fail even when using a real and clear photo, state legislatures 
have to grapple with what could happen if something other than a clear 
photo is used.122 Further, most composite sketch searches fail,123 so states 
need to clearly define whether the use of composite sketch images with 
FRT should be allowed to lead to an arrest. If the use is strictly to build a 
lead, but more evidence is needed to make an arrest, the use of composite 
sketches might be acceptable. However, legislatures should be wary of 
adding in any use of composite sketches beyond that which is well tested by 
third-party organizations. If matches based on composite sketches are no 
better than an actual lineup of suspects, they only serve to hinder the law 
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enforcement system by placing added burdens on investigation. 
Furthermore, composite sketch matches do no more than what we require a 
human to do in a lineup, but an FRT cannot testify in court, posing yet 
another threat to due process. Thus, the FRT may raise rather than lower 
costs. 
States must also determine whether manipulated photos (e.g. the addition 
of a mouth, eyebrows, or ears) can be used to determine a match and, if so, 
how much manipulation is acceptable. Legislatures must require that 
original and updated probe images become a part of any investigative 
record, using audits to ensure that law enforcement follows policies and to 
provide a record that may be used in court. States should set strict 
guidelines for the lowest threshold a facial match can have to merit follow-
up on an investigative action, and additional guidelines for match thresholds 
if there is enhancement to a photo or a composite sketch is used.124 States 
should bar any further action on a match aside from consideration as a 
potential suspect to look into, rather than providing probable cause for 
arrest, or even a lineup.125 Most technology allows for the thresholds to be 
heightened or lowered to gather more potential matches; therefore, if a 
match is truly only going to be used to further looking into a suspect or if 
there is more cause for someone already considered a suspect, a lower 
threshold may be allowed because the outcome of the match is only 
furthering an investigation.126 For law enforcement to be allowed to follow 
up a match with confrontation, the minimum threshold should be ninety-
five percent or higher, similar to suggested standards set for uses in 
banking.127 This standard is used in banking because it is a step in the 
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institutions.128 Similarly, a high threshold should be required prior to 
confrontation as civil liberties necessitate more certainty than access to 
financial institutions. 
D. Technology Vetting Process 
The second step for states is to implement a vetting system for any facial 
recognition technology that might be used.129 Because FRT technology 
continues to be commercially developed for non-law enforcement and law 
enforcement purposes,130 state legislatures should appoint an on-going 
committee of ten to fifteen people to vet FRT technology. The vetting 
committee must be assembled by a bipartisan group of legislators and 
composed of experts in technology, law enforcement, and privacy law. This 
vetting committe would be tasked with assessing technology, making yearly 
suggestions to the legislative body on advancements in technology, and 
proposing reconsiderations for FRT usage.131 The committee must assure 
that any technology used has gone through rigorous third-party testing to 
meet accuracy standards that they suggest to the legislature. To meet the 
standards of rigor required for vetting committees, legislatures may elect to 
partner with other states’ committees. The vetting committee will determine 
what technologies to assess by identifying the technologies offered by 
companies with the greatest market share in facial recognition and machine 
learning; also, the technology must go through third-party testing for 
matching accuracy, mismatching accuracy, and gender and skin-tone bias. 
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Because some municipalities may have used FRTs and acquired 
information about the technology, a vetting committee could capitalize on 
that knowledge by asking for proposals from the municipalities. If 
municipalities suggest FRT, they should explain why they would like to use 
the technologies to enhance their law enforcement capabilities. Suggestions 
from municipalities could include how FRT may help in investigations and 
the specific types of investigations for which they would use FRT. 
Alternatively, a vetting committee may resolve to procure third-party 
assessments of technology from companies with the greatest current FRT 
market share.132 Although the vetting committee would be tasked with 
determining which technologies will go through the process of vetting, state 
legislatures must ultimately agree to the standards for accuracy. The vetting 
committee’s standards should require legislatures to account for the 
technology’s bias in false match rates and the potential for photo 
enhancements or alterations to be used on probe images. 
The standard vetted FRT must demonstrate it overcomes bias between 
rates of mismatches due to gender or skin tone.133 If a probe of images has a 
statistically lower chance of matching based on gender, race, skin tone, and 
age, then it should not be considered for implementation.134 A confidence 
threshold should be established requiring the software to match at a rate of 
ninety-five percent or greater regardless of any of these defining 
characteristics.135 To be approved for use, an FRT must cross the threshold 
into statistically non-biased mismatching, which means, at the very least, 
equal match confidence ratings regardless of gender or skin tone.136 If an 
FRT system is found to have statistically significant differences in finding 
matches based on those characteristics, the system should not be used 
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because to do so would perpetuate issues of disparate policing on already 
vulnerable groups.137 
FRT mismatches inspire the use of modifications practices such as 
adding eyes or a mouth to a photo in an attempt to achieve a match.138 If 
modification practices are allowed at all, they must be done according to the 
recommendations of the FRT providers or through agreed upon methods 
which should be determined ad hoc by the vetting committee and ultimately 
approved by the legislature for use by law enforcement.139 The pressure to 
enhance or alter photos increases greatly if the technology adopted is 
already less likely to find a match because of its gender or skin tone biases, 
or because it has low thresholds for returning matches.140 Some practices 
are unregulated and not suggested by FRT companies, such as pasting lips 
or noses onto low grade or poorly lit photos or using software to make 
three-dimensional models of a face from a partial-face photo; these 
problematic practices bring up questions that should be answered prior to 
the use of FRT.141 If law enforcement agencies were to use matches from 
enhanced photos as sufficient probable cause, significant problems would 
arise due to the inherent potential for a mismatch in the FRT system 
combined with the fact the match is based on a computer-generated photo 
rather than an actual photo. Ultimately, an enhanced photo may be no 
better, and is more likely worse, than a composite sketch.142 If methods of 
enhancement are used, they should not be disproportionately implemented. 
In order to avoid disproportionate implementation, a vetting committee 
should rely on reports from government agencies like NIST and those of 
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independent agencies like Gender Shades. A vetting committee must be 
certain that any FRT system approved for law enforcement use does not 
have statistically higher mismatches based on gender, race, skin tone, or 
age. 
E. Training and Auditing 
FRT vetting must also include a training and auditing process. The 
implementation of FRT training should require that those running probe 
photos know how to work the technology. The training process should be 
based on the best practices for assuring that training for municipalities is 
implemented according to the suggestions of the vetting committee and the 
FRT vendors.143 Training should include a definite threshold adjustment for 
likely matches and identify how the threshold can be adjusted when making 
a match using FRT. Vetting committees must ensure that any FRT system 
chosen has codified training processes and those processes can be 
manageably followed. Only users who have been certified through the 
approved vetting training process should be allowed access to the facial 
recognition software to attempt matches. Certifying users would reduce the 
possiblity that they will act upon matches received under lower than 
legislatively mandated thresholds. Thus, this process would cut down on the 
potential for acting on matches when received under lower thresholds than 
mandated by the legislature. 
Legislatures considering FRT must also decide if using matches based on 
enhanced or altered probative images or using police sketches is acceptable, 
and what happens with any match actually found using these methods.144 
Inappropriate searches could include those with a lower threshold for 
matching or inappropriate use of enhancing or manipulating photos.145 If a 
legislature determines that certain types of image enhancements are 
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acceptable, the processes of enhancement should be uniform across the 
state’s municipalities that implement FRT. Each municipality must keep 
clear documentation of the processes implemented for each photo 
enhancement. An auditing process must also be maintained. The auditing 
process must provide a standardized system to review documentation on 
how matches are being conducted and to document when facial recognition 
searches are run inappropriately. The auditing process is also necessary to 
ensure that FRT systems are updated and systems that support photo 
enhancement are implemented appropriately. 
F. Procedures for Collected Data 
Legislatures must also make a decision about where and how FRT face 
data is to be stored and processed to ensure the data is protected.146 
Biometric data, including facial data, have legal privacy obligations, and 
this data must be protected from being hacked.147 Although there is federal 
protection against the accessing of information on any computer without 
consent through the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, laws do not always 
stop hacking.148 Furthermore, biometric data is at a great risk of attack 
because it can be tied to personal use, such as phone password and 
security.149 
The importance of biometric data security is made explicit in Illinois’ 
Biometric Information Privacy Act.150 Unlike social security numbers, 
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biometric data is “biologically unique to the individual; therefore, once 
compromised the individual has no recourse, is at heightened risk for 
identity theft, and is likely to withdraw from biometric-facilitated 
transactions.”151 Additionally, the Biometric Information Privacy Act only 
controls for data losses by commercial, not public, entities.152 Law 
enforcement must be aware of the risk associated with collecting this 
data.153 The protection of all biometric data should be held to a high 
standard, from probe images created using security or surveillance cameras 
(also referred to as closed-circuit television or CCTV) to facial recognition 
run in real-time from body cameras.154 Similar to recourse available for data 
breaches of software companies where there is financial harm, there must 
be recourse for breaches in biometric data, and those costs must be weighed 
in a legislature’s decision to implement technology that requires protection 
of so much data.155 
Any collection of data has the possibility of breach.156 Currently, there is 
no overarching federal restriction on the release of personal data.157 States 
recognize that their residents’ privacy and security is at risk when personal 
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157 See Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES 
(updated July 17, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-
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Columbia have some restrictions on the release of personal data, what data 
falls under privacy requirements and when someone should be notified that 
their personal data has been breached is far from ubiquitous.159 
In some states, like North Carolina, biometric data is included in the list 
of personal information that may not be released.160 However, the North 
Carolina statute requires affirmatively objecting to disclosure of personal 
information; to violate the act a person must “knowingly broadcast or 
publish . . . with actual knowledge that the person whose personal 
information is disclosed has previously objected to any such disclosure, 
which is likely opposite of how many imagine their personal data is 
protected.”161 A large amount of data can be collected by means of real-
time data collection.162 State legislatures must ensure that the biometric data 
collected by any FRT must not only remain private but be actionably 
protected. Currently, civil action may be the only recourse for owners of 
biometric data who object to their data’s disclosure. There is current federal 
protection for health data, which includes biometric data if collected for 
health services.163 However, the privacy of health information only applies 
to certain entities.164 
Legislatures and ultimately municipalities must take into account that 
cybercrime is increasing each year.165 Cybercrime makes it increasingly 
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163 Your Rights Under HIPAA, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
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164 O’Connor, supra note 156. 
165 Kelly Bissel, Ryan M. Lasalle & Paolo Dal Cin, Ninth Annual Cost of Cybercrime 
Study, ACCENTURE (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.accenture.com/us-
342 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
difficult to ascertain overall costs of implementing an FRT that collects data 
susceptible to cybercrime attacks.166 When municipalities are assessing 
whether they want to implement FRT, they must account for the cost of 
cybersecurity necessary for implementation. Cybercrime analysts expect 
that regardless of protection, at some point, all databases may be hacked.167 
Actionable protection should include civil action against the disclosure and 
penalties for enforcement agencies who do not attempt to maintain their 
cybersecurity and keep this information private.168 
G. Transparency of Data Collection 
Along with assuring the protection of any biometric data gathered by law 
enforcement, there should be public transparency about what records or 
systems are being used as databases to match probe photos. Often systems 
only scan mugshots, but at times, law enforcement will request a probe 
photo to be run through other jurisdictions’ systems.169 For instance, the 
FBI is reported to be able to use sixteen different state databases,170 
meaning that data collected by a state municipality may be used in systems 
outside of that state; if that is the case, transparency is necessary to ensure 
that, if a breach occurs, action can be taken by those affected to resolve the 
breach. 
As far as it has been reported, law enforcement agencies match probe 
photos to their own internal booking databases or license photos.171 
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However, without legislative action, it is uncertain what happens to the data 
after it is collected.172 Legislative action should ensure all collected data is 
not sold, and the vetting committee should ensure the terms of any FRT 
technology do not allow the vendors of the technology to take or use any of 
the collected biometric data.173 In summary, once the data is collected by 
the law enforcement agency, it should not be in the control of any other 
party after collection. 
H. Uncompromised Restrictions on FRT Usage During Certain Types of 
Events 
State legislatures should also determine time and place restrictions on 
how FRT data can be used. Time and place restrictions are especially 
important if legislatures are going to allow for real-time facial recognition 
to occur through bodycams, security cameras, or any other form of 
instantaneous facial capture and match.174 A high degree of matching 
accuracy, at least ninety-five percent, must be achieved specifically for any 
FRT matching in real-time.175 A mismatch in real-time can lead to “a 
deadly interaction between law enforcement and that person.”176 The 
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purported benefit of real-time facial recognition is its use in crowd 
situations to identify suspected terrorists, which makes accuracy 
imperative.177 
To ensure the public’s First and Fourth Amendment rights, real-time 
surveillance should be forbidden during instances of protected speech.178 
Furthermore, FRT use at events like protests can amplify issues that have 
resulted from over-policing where minorities may be more likely to set off 
alerts by real-time recognition systems due to prior bookings, regardless of 
actual convictions.179 The California legislative assembly spoke directly to 
this concern in its proposed legislation, stating that the collection of 
biometric data through facial recognition technology “may chill the exercise 
of free speech in public places.”180 
The potential for real-time FR-enabled policing to suppress 
constitutionally protected acts presents legislatures with the need for a 
heightened level of care and consideration, specifically in the 
implementation of real-time recognition technologies.181 Without heavy 
regulation, the potential for misuse is significant, especially on the 
collection of real-time data.182 It is a short move from using the technology 
to identify missing persons to functioning as a “roving surveillance 
system.”183 Furthermore, additional implications will arise if real-time 
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recognition leads to real-time police tracking, which often requires a 
warrant.184 
I. Critiques 
Where is the money coming from? This is where the voters come in. Not 
only is legislative action needed, but the voters must be the ones to decide 
whether FRT is acceptable in our law enforcement system. Funds are 
already being used to implement unregulated use of FRT in law 
enfocement, which means citizens, through their taxes, are already funding 
a system with little to no transparency about how it is being used. If FRT is 
to be allowed back in use after a moratorium, the money must come from 
somewhere, and it should be for representatives of the voters to decide 
whether it is worth the cost to implement a potentially harmful system into 
law enforcement. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A moratorium must be placed on law enforcement’s use of FRT. 
Although FRT capabilities have enhanced greatly in the past decade, the 
leaps it has made are not enough for it to be implemented in our day-to-day 
lives. Biases remain in the software itself. The FRT systems are incapable 
of providing the same level of matches, and mismatches increase when the 
systems are required to process probe photos of anyone who is not a white 
cisgender male. These issues must be corrected before FRT can be 
implemented to enhance public safety. State legislatures must enact the 
moratoriums on FRT use by law enforcement. If a state determines that the 
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(“[T]he federal courts are in some disagreement as to whether probable cause or simply 
specific and articulable facts are required for authorization to access [historical cell-site 
location information].”); United States v. Espudo, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1038–39 (S.D. 
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moratorium is adequate for the FRT, then an assessment must occur 
through purposeful determinations of how the technology may be 
implemented in the public safety sphere. Those determinations require the 
formation and use of a bipartisan vetting committee comprised of experts in 
multiple fields with the ability to assess the technology’s capabilities and 
how it should be implemented. These determinations must constantly 
consider any abuses or infringements upon civil rights and civil liberties 
and the detrimental impact on communities already subject to overpolicing. 
Regulation of FRT is the only way this technology should be allowed in the 
hands of law enforcement. 
 
